Wittgensteins Children: Some Implications for Teaching and Otherness :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Wittgenstein's Children: Some Implications for Teaching and Otherness ABSTRACT: The later Wittgenstein uses children in his philosophical arguments against the traditional views of language. Describing how they learn language is one of his philosophical methods for setting philosophers free from their views and enabling them to see the world in a different way. The purpose of this paper is to explore what features of children he takes advantage of in his arguments, and to show how we can read Wittgenstein in terms of education. Two children in Philosophical Investigations are discussed. The feature of the first child is the qualitative difference from adults. Wittgenstein uses the feature to criticize Augustinian pictures of language which tell us that children learn language by ostensive definition alone. The referential theory of meaning is so strong that philosophers fail to see the qualitative gap and to explain language-learning. The second child appears in an arithmetical instruction. Although he was understood to master counting numbers, he sudd enly shows deviant reactions. Wittgenstein argues against the mentalistic idea of understanding by calling attention to the potential otherness of the child. This could happen anytime the child has not learned counting correctly. The two features show that teaching is unlike telling, an activity toward the other who does not understand our explanations. Since we might not understand learners because of otherness, the justification of teaching is a crucial problem that is not properly answered so long as otherness is unrecognized. As long as we ignore otherness, we would not be aware that we might mistreat learners. Ludwig Wittgenstein is a philosopher who often uses educational situations to examine philosophical puzzles. Asking how a word is taught is one of his philosophical methods. He invents imaginary situations in which children learn language, and describes how they learn there. He investigates the possibilities of concepts by considering how children could learn the concepts. The purpose of this paper is to explore what features of children he takes advantage of in his philosophical arguments, and to show whether and how we can read Wittgenstein in terms of education. Some scholars have expected Wittgenstein to contribute to pedagogy and educational research directly. Bartley claims, for example, that Wittgenstein is involved in child psychology. (1) Hardwick looks for pedagogical conclusions in Wittgenstein's philosophy. (2) Those scholars are likely to say that Wittgenstein merely suggests what empirical studies discover about language learning. Wittgenstein's Children: Some Implications for Teaching and Otherness :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays Wittgenstein's Children: Some Implications for Teaching and Otherness ABSTRACT: The later Wittgenstein uses children in his philosophical arguments against the traditional views of language. Describing how they learn language is one of his philosophical methods for setting philosophers free from their views and enabling them to see the world in a different way. The purpose of this paper is to explore what features of children he takes advantage of in his arguments, and to show how we can read Wittgenstein in terms of education. Two children in Philosophical Investigations are discussed. The feature of the first child is the qualitative difference from adults. Wittgenstein uses the feature to criticize Augustinian pictures of language which tell us that children learn language by ostensive definition alone. The referential theory of meaning is so strong that philosophers fail to see the qualitative gap and to explain language-learning. The second child appears in an arithmetical instruction. Although he was understood to master counting numbers, he sudd enly shows deviant reactions. Wittgenstein argues against the mentalistic idea of understanding by calling attention to the potential otherness of the child. This could happen anytime the child has not learned counting correctly. The two features show that teaching is unlike telling, an activity toward the other who does not understand our explanations. Since we might not understand learners because of otherness, the justification of teaching is a crucial problem that is not properly answered so long as otherness is unrecognized. As long as we ignore otherness, we would not be aware that we might mistreat learners. Ludwig Wittgenstein is a philosopher who often uses educational situations to examine philosophical puzzles. Asking how a word is taught is one of his philosophical methods. He invents imaginary situations in which children learn language, and describes how they learn there. He investigates the possibilities of concepts by considering how children could learn the concepts. The purpose of this paper is to explore what features of children he takes advantage of in his philosophical arguments, and to show whether and how we can read Wittgenstein in terms of education. Some scholars have expected Wittgenstein to contribute to pedagogy and educational research directly. Bartley claims, for example, that Wittgenstein is involved in child psychology. (1) Hardwick looks for pedagogical conclusions in Wittgenstein's philosophy. (2) Those scholars are likely to say that Wittgenstein merely suggests what empirical studies discover about language learning.